Thanks for your investigation.
There is not such a character actualy but that character may play a role in that specific kind of malcode.
Someone should add these to regexpressions used in IDS sigs!
That is why I mentioned it.
#
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"ET CURRENT_EVENTS Possible BHEK Landing URI Format"; flow:to_server,established; urilen:>41; content:".php"; http_uri; fast_pattern:only; pcre:"/\/[a-f0-9]{32}\/[a-z]+?\-[a-z]+?\.php/U"; classtype:trojan-activity; sid:2017376; rev:6;)
But we have to be cautious with this one, because it is FP prone,
but there were many right hits as well - do a search up on urlquery scans for that).
Read on this sig here:
http://t46633.security-ids-snort-emerging-sigs.securityupdate.info/false-positive-2015797-bhek-2-landing-3-t46633.html
(info thanks to Will Metcalf * on a question from frank in a Security IDS Snort Emerging Sigs discussion,
N.B. credits go to aforementioned specialist *.
The redirect to: qpnkczev.sytes.net does not resolve anymore,
Well, sytes dot net is a known malware distributor (Dynamic DNS) :
http://www.mywot.com/en/scorecard/sytes.net?utm_source=addon&utm_content=popup-donuts
Read on this here: htx p://blog.sucuri.net/2013/10/malware-iframe-campaign-from-sytes-net.html
(avast! Web Shield blocks something on this blog site as infested with HTML:Iframe-BJA[Trj])